Abstract-Debugging or fault localization is one of the most challenging tasks during software development. Many tools have been developed to reduce the amount of effort and time software developers have to spend on fault localization. In this paper, we evaluate the effectiveness of a fault localization tool called BEN in localizing different types of software fault. Assuming that combinatorial testing has been performed on the subject program, BEN leverages the result obtained from combinatorial testing to perform fault localization.
I. INTRODUCTION
Debugging or fault localization refers to the activity of localizing software faults in a program and is considered to be one of the most challenging tasks during software development [14] . Many tools have been developed to reduce the amount of time and effort software developers have to spend on fault localization. Spectrum-based fault localization is an important approach for automatic fault localization. A program spectrum records information about a test execution [24] such as program paths and function call counts [21] . Spectrum-based fault localization identifies faults by comparing the spectra of failing and passing test executions. The key observation is that faulty statements are more likely to be exercised by failing tests than passing tests [11] .
Ghandehari et al. [11, 12] reported a spectrum-based fault localization tool called BEN that leverages the results obtained from combinatorial testing to perform fault localization. It is assumed that a combinatorial test set has already been executed, and the result of each test execution is available. BEN locates faults in a two-phase process. In the first phase, BEN tries to identify a combination that is likely to be failureinducing. A combination is a failure-inducing combination if it causes any test in which it appears to fail [12] . In the second phase, BEN uses the failure-inducing combination to generate a small group of tests that contains one failing test (core member) and a small number of passing tests (derived members). After the core and derived members are executed, BEN compares the spectrum of the core member to the spectrum of each derived member and produces a ranking of statements in terms of their likelihood to be faulty [9] .
In this paper, we report an experimental evaluation of the effectiveness of BEN in localizing different types of software fault. We measure the effectiveness of BEN in terms of the percentage of (executable) statements the user has to inspect to locate a faulty statement in a program. The fewer statements the user has to inspect, the more effective BEN is considered to be. We focus on how the following three properties of software fault affect the effectiveness of BEN: (1) accessibility, which refers to the degree of difficulty to reach (and execute) a fault during a program execution; (2) input value sensitivity: A fault is input value sensitive if the execution of the fault triggers a failure only for some input values but not for other input values; and (3) control flow sensitivity: A fault is control-flow sensitive if the execution of the fault triggers a failure while inducing a change of control flow in program execution.
In our experiments, we applied BEN to the Siemens suite, the grep program, and the gzip program, all of which are from the Software Infrastructure Repository [23] . These programs were used by Ghandehari et al. [13] to evaluate the effectiveness of BEN in general, i.e., not with respect to the three fault properties. We use a random test set-based approach to measure the three properties of each fault. The experimental results suggest that BEN is more effective, respectively, in localizing faults of lower accessibility, input value-insensitive faults or control flow-insensitive faults than localizing faults of higher accessibility, input value-sensitive or control flowsensitive faults in the subject programs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides an overview of BEN. Section III discusses the three fault properties and how to measure them both in theory and in practice. Section IV presents our experimental design and results. Section V discusses existing work on evaluating the effectiveness of fault localization techniques. Section VI provides concluding remarks and discusses future work.
II. OVERVIEW OF BEN
The fault localization process of BEN consists of two major phases. In the first phase, BEN identifies a combination that is likely to be a failure-inducing combination. In the second phase, BEN generates a small group of tests using the failure-inducing combination identified in the first phase and then produces a ranking of statements in terms of their likelihood to be faulty.
A. Phase 1
Assume that combinatorial testing has been performed. BEN takes as input a combinatorial test set with execution results. It adopts an iterative framework to identify a failureinducing combination. At each iteration, BEN first analyzes a test set F to identify a set of suspicious combinations. F is initially the combinatorial test set taken as input. Suspicious combinations are candidates of failure-inducing combinations, and are ranked in terms of their likelihood to be failureinducing.
Next, a small number of new tests are generated for a userspecified number of top-ranked suspicious combinations. If all the new tests containing a suspicious combination c fail, c is marked as a failure-inducing combination. Otherwise, all the new tests are added to test set F and are used to refine the identification of suspicious combinations and the computation of their rankings in the next iteration.
BEN repeats the two steps, i.e., rank generation and test generation until a stopping condition is satisfied [9, 11, 12] , i.e., either a failure-inducing combination is identified or the user decides to stop the process, e.g. because of resource limitation. In the latter case, the top-ranked suspicious combination is reported as a failure-inducing combination.
B. Phase 2
In this phase, a small group of tests S is first generated from the failure-inducing combination identified in the first phase. The group contains one core member (failed test) and several derived members (passed tests). The core member contains the failure-inducing combination, and produces the failed execution. The derived members are derived from the core member. A derived member is expected to produce an execution trace that is similar to the execution trace of the core member, but produces a different outcome, i.e., passed execution. The key observation is that a fault is likely to be exercised by a failed execution but not by a passed execution whose trace is very similar [21] .
BEN compares the spectrum of the core member with the spectrum of each derived member to compute a suspiciousness score of each statement with respect to the derived member. Statements that are only executed by the core member are considered highly suspicious and are assigned 1.0 as their accessibility score. Statements that are executed by both the core member and the derived member are considered less suspicious, and are given 0.5 as their accessibility score. Statements that are not executed by the core member are considered not suspicious and are given 0 as their accessibility score.
The final suspiciousness score of a statement is the average of the suspiciousness score of the statement with respect to every derived member. Statements are ranked in a nonascending order of their final suspiciousness scores.
The ranking of statements can be used to locate a faulty statement as follows. The user first investigates statements that are in the top rank. If the user cannot locate the fault in the top ranked statements, the user investigates statements in the next rank. This process is repeated until a faulty statement is found. The effectiveness of BEN is measured in terms of the percentage of statements the user has to inspect to locate the fault. Fewer statements inspected means greater effectiveness.
III. FAULT PROPERTIES
In this section, we define three properties of software fault, namely accessibility, input value sensitivity and control flow sensitivity. We also discuss how to measure the three properties.
A. Accessibility
Accessibility refers to the degree of difficulty to reach (or execute) a fault during a program execution. Since a fault must be executed before it is detected, faults of lower accessibility can be more difficult to detect than faults of higher accessibility.
The notion of accessibility score can be used to measure accessibility. The accessibility score of a fault is defined as the ratio of the number of tests that execute the fault to the total number of all the possible tests, i.e., tests that would be included in the exhaustive test set. For example, if a fault has an accessibility score of 0.9, it indicates that 90% of all the possible tests would execute the fault. In practice, this score is based on a random sample of the exhaustive set, as described later.
We assume that the input space of a program is finite or has been made finite through necessary abstractions. This is the case for combinatorial testing as a combinatorial test model consists of a finite number of parameters, each of which has a finite number of values. Thus, accessibility scores range from 0 to 1.
Consider the example program in Table I . The applyDiscount function takes three inputs, totalPrice, member and type, and returns the final price after applying a discount. Table II shows the input model of this function. Table III shows the exhaustive test set consisting of 12 tests created from the input model in Table II. There are three faults in the example program, i.e., lines 5, 11, and 18. To compute the accessibility of each fault, we execute all the tests in the exhaustive test set and collect their execution traces. The traces are shown in Table I , columns 3 to 14. In the table, 1 indicates that a statement is executed by a test, whereas 0 indicates that a statement is not executed by a test.
The accessibility score of the fault in line 5 is 1 since it is executed by all the 12 tests. The accessibility score of the fault in line 11 is 2/12 = 0.17 since two out of 12 tests execute line 11. The accessibility score of the fault in line 18 is 1 since it is executed by all the 12 tests.
In practice, it is nearly always impossible to generate and execute all possible tests. Thus, it can be difficult to precisely compute an accessibility score. One option is to estimate an accessibility score using a random test set, which is a representative, statistic sample of the exhaustive test set. The size of such a random set can be determined based on the program's input model and the amount of resources available.
Bandyopadhyay et al. introduced the notion of accessibility [5] . Their approach to measure accessibility is different from ours. Let f be a fault in a program P. The accessibility score of f is computed as the percentage of the statements in the backward slice of f. This approach requires static analysis of the source code, which can be difficult for practical applications. However, it does not depend on the program's input model. In contrast, the input model of a program may affect the accessibility score computed by our approach.
B. Input Value Sensitivity
A software fault is considered to be input-value sensitive if the execution of the fault triggers a failure only for some input values but not for other input values. In other words, the execution of an input value-sensitive fault does not necessarily trigger a failure. If a fault is input-value sensitive, it must be executed by both failed and passed tests. If a fault is inputvalue insensitive, it must be exercised by failed tests only.
In the example program, the faults in lines 5 and 18 are input value-sensitive, since they are executed by both failed and passed tests. For example, the two faults are executed by both T1 and T5, whereas T1 is a passed test, and T5 is a failed test. On the other hand, the fault in line 11 is input valueinsensitive, since it is executed only by failed tests, T8 and T12.
Since generating all possible tests is not practical, we use a random test set to determine whether a fault is input valuesensitive. Note that there must exist at least one failed and T1  T2  T3  T4  T5  T6  T7  T8  T9  T10 T11 T12 4. //Fault 1 -correct :if(totalPrice>1000) - passed test, as we need to compare the execution traces of failed and passed tests. When the random test set does not contain any failed or passed test, additional tests need to be added, as discussed in detail in Section IV.D.
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C. Control Flow Sensitivity
A fault is control flow-sensitive if the execution of the fault triggers a failure while inducing a change of control flow in program execution. A fault is control flow-insensitive if the execution of the fault triggers a failure but never induce a change of control flow in program execution.
One approach to determining whether a fault is control flow sensitive is as follows. Let P be a faulty program that contains only one fault. Let P' be the error-free program that does not contain any fault. We execute the exhaustive test set on P, and record the traces of all the failed tests. These failed tests are executed again on P' and their execution traces are recorded. Then we compare the execution trace of each test collected from P to the execution trace of the same test collected from P'. The fault is control flow-sensitive if there exists at least one test such that its execution trace collected from P is different from it execution trace collected from P' after the fault is executed in the program execution.
Again, in practice, it is nearly always impossible to execute all the failed tests that execute the fault. A practical option is to execute a random test set instead of the exhaustive test set. Table IV shows the error-free version of the example program and the execution traces of all the failed tests on this version. The first four tests, T5, T6, T7 and T8, have different execution traces on the faulty version (Table I) than on the error-free version (Table IV) , after executing the fault in line 5. Therefore the fault in line 5 changes the control flow of program execution and is determined to be control flowsensitive. In contrast, the fault in line 11 is control flowinsensitive since the only failed test, T12, that executes the fault (on the faulty version) has the same execution trace as it is executed on the error-free version. Similarly, the fault in line 18 is also control flow-insensitive.
We point out that this notion is different from the notion of impact in [5] . The latter is measured by the fraction of the source code that is affected by the execution of a faulty statement. Again, this measurement requires static analysis that can be difficult for practical applications. However, unlike our approach, it does not depend on the input model.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we present the design of our experiments and discuss the experimental results.
A. Subject Programs
The subject programs used in our experiments include the Siemens suite and two real-life programs, grep and gzip [23].
1) Siemens suite
The Siemens suite consists of 7 programs namely schedule, schedule2, printtokens, printtokens2, totinfo, tcas and replace. Each of these programs contains several faulty versions. Table  V shows the number of faulty versions and the number of lines of the executable (source) code for each program. Each faulty version contains a single faulty statement. The number of lines of executable code is computed using GCOV 4.1.2 [8] . Note T5  T6  T7  T8  T9  T10 T11 T12 1. float applyDiscount(int totalPrice,int member, char type) The two programs, schedule and schedule2, implement different scheduling algorithms. There are three different priority queues, low, medium and high. The program takes as input the size of each priority queue and a list of commands that could be performed on threads e.g., move threads between the different queues.
Program Statements
The tcas program is an aircraft collision avoidance system. It takes as input 12 numbers that represent different flight parameters of two aircrafts. Then it generates as output a resolution advisory. The totinfo program takes as input one or more tables of numbers and determines whether these numbers follow a statistical distribution.
2) grep and gzip
The grep program takes two inputs, patterns and files. It prints the lines in all the files that match any of the patterns. Since each faulty version contains a single fault, the terms faulty version and fault are used interchangeably in the rest of the paper. [3] . All the faulty versions of each subject program were tested using a 2-way test set first. If a faulty version is not killed by a 2-way test set, i.e. no failed test is found, we increment the strength of the combinatorial test set up to 6. Table VIII shows the number of killed versions of each program. Note that not every faulty version is killed by a test set of strength up to six. The faulty versions that are not killed are excluded in our experiments.
B. Input Parameter Models

C. Fault Localization Results
The effectiveness of BEN is measured in terms of the percentage of the source code the user has to inspect to locate the fault. The first step in our experiment is to perform fault localization on the subject programs using BEN and determine the percentage of the source code that must be inspected for each fault. This information forms the basis for our experiment. Ghandehari et al. [13] has reported an experimental evaluation of BEN in which BEN was used to locate the faults in the same set of subject programs. The results obtained from this experimental evaluation are re-used in our experiments. 
D. Measurement of Fault Properties
For each subject program, we randomly generate a set of 1000 tests if the size of the exhaustive test set is more than 1000. The exhaustive test set for the gzip program has 395 tests. Therefore, we use the exhaustive test set, instead of a random test set, for the gzip program. The gzip program is the only program for which the size of the exhaustive test set is less than 1000. The same random test set is used for programs that share the same input parameter model. For example, the same random test set is used for the two programs, schedule and schedule2, since they share the same input parameter model.
If the input parameter model does not have any constraint, a random test is created in a way that for each parameter, we randomly select one of the possible values from its corresponding domain. If the model has one or more constraints, a random test is created in a way that it does not violate the constraint. A straightforward approach is the following. After a random test is constructed, the validity of the test, i.e., whether it satisfies all the constraints, is checked. If the test is valid, it is added to the random test set. Otherwise, another random test is constructed until a valid test is found. A more efficient algorithm for random test generation with constraints can be found at [10] .
Next, we execute the random test set on all the faulty versions that are killed by combinatorial testing. To measure accessibility, the execution status, i.e., fail and pass, of each test, is not needed. However, in order to measure input valueand control flow-sensitivity, we need to compare execution traces of passed and failed tests. Thus, the execution status of each test is needed. Moreover, there must exist at least one failed and passed test.
If the random test set does not contain passed and failed tests, we add a test with the desired outcome from the initial combinatorial test set. Adding a test does not affect the measurement of the two properties, input value and control flow sensitivity, since the result is yes or no, instead of a ratio. For example, eight faulty versions of the tcas program does not produce any failed test of 1000 random test set, i.e., all the 1000 random test passed. So, for these eight faulty versions, we included an additional failed test from the initial test set.
1) Accessibility
We divide all the faults into two groups: high accessibility, and low accessibility. First, we compute the accessibility of each fault as discussed in Section III. Recall that accessibility is a continuous value between 0 and 1. We have used a threshold value of 0.50 for dividing the faults into two groups. i.e., if the accessibility score of a fault is less than 0.50, it is categorized as a fault of low accessibility; otherwise it is categorized as a fault of high accessibility.
2) Input Value Sensitivity
To determine whether a fault is input value sensitive, we collect the execution traces of all the random tests. For each fault, if there exists at least one passed test that executes the fault, then the fault is considered to be input value sensitive. Otherwise, the fault is considered to be input value insensitive.
3) Control Flow Sensitivity
To determine whether a fault is control flow sensitive, we first execute all the failed tests of the random test set on the error-free version of the subject program and record the traces of these tests. Next, we randomly pick a failed test and compare the execution trace on the error-free version with the execution trace on the faulty version. If this comparison shows that a fault triggers a change in program flow and results in a failure, the fault is considered to be a control flow sensitive fault. Otherwise, we continue to perform this comparison for the remaining failed test cases. If there exists at least one failed test case for which the comparison indicates a change in the program flow, then we consider the fault a control flow sensitive fault. Otherwise, it is considered control flow insensitive.
E. Results
In this section, we discuss the results of our experiments. Table IX represents the overall results from our experiments. There is a total of 124 faults of all the subject programs, i.e., including the Siemens suite, the grep program, and the gzip program that are killed by combinatorial testing. As shown in Table IX , these faults are divided into eight groups, based on the three fault properties. In the first two columns, "Y" (or "N") indicates that the corresponding fault property is true (or false). In the third column, "H" (or "L") indicates high (or low) accessibility.
It is interesting to note that Table IX shows the majority of the faults, i.e., 56 out 124 faults, are both input value-and control flow-sensitive and are of high accessibility. Also, there 
is no fault that is, at the same time, input value and control flow-insensitive and is of high accessibility.
1) Impact of accessibility
To determine the impact of accessibility on BEN's effectiveness in localizing faults, we compare the percentage of code that has to be inspected for faults that have different accessibility levels but the same input value-and control flowsensitivity properties. To facilitate this comparison, we rearrange the rows in Table IX into four groups as shown in Table X . Table X shows that a higher percentage of code needs to be inspected for faults of high accessibility (but with the same input value-and control flow-sensitivity properties) in three of the four groups, i.e., groups 1, 2 and 3. The only exception is group 4 in which the number of faults of high accessibility is zero. This suggests that BEN is likely to be more effective for faults of low accessibility.
The above result is to some extent surprising, as one would typically expect that faults of low accessibility are more difficult to locate. This, however, can be explained by how BEN works. First, the core member fails, which means that the fault (to be located) must be executed, regardless of whether the fault is of high or low accessibility. Recall that each faulty version only contains a single fault. Second, if a fault is of low accessibility, it is more difficult for a derived member to execute it. This means that the fault is only executed by the core member. Thus, the corresponding faulty statement is likely to be ranked high, requiring a less percentage of code to be inspected.
2) Impact of input value sensitivity
To determine the impact of input value sensitivity on BEN's effectiveness in localizing faults, we compare the percentage of code that has to be inspected for faults that have the same values for control flow sensitivity and accessibility but different values for input value sensitivity. To facilitate this comparison, we re-arrange the rows in Table IX into four groups, as shown in Table XI . Table XI shows that a significantly higher percentage of code needs to be inspected for input value-sensitive faults than for input value-insensitive faults for groups 1 and 2. For group 4, a lower percentage of code needs to be inspected for input value-sensitive faults than input value-insensitive faults. For group 3, the comparison cannot be made, as the number of faults that are input value-insensitive is zero.
While more data is needed to make a definitive conclusion, the data suggests that BEN is likely to be more effective in localizing input value-insensitive faults than input valuesensitive faults. This is expected since input value-insensitive faults can be executed only by the core member, i.e., not by the derived members, while input value-sensitive faults could be executed by both the core member and the derived members. As a result, input value-insensitive faults are likely to be ranked higher than input value-sensitive faults.
3) Impact of control flow sensitivity
To determine the impact of control flow sensitivity on BEN's effectiveness in localizing faults, we compare the percentage of code that has to be inspected for faults that have the same values for input value sensitivity and accessibility but different values for control flow sensitivity. To facilitate this comparison, we re-arrange the rows in Table IX into four groups, as shown in Table XII . Table XII shows that a higher percentage of code needs to be inspected for control flow-insensitive faults than for control flow-sensitive faults for groups 1 and 4. For group 2, lower percentage of code needs to be inspected for control flowinsensitive faults than control flow-sensitive faults. For group 3, the comparison cannot be made as the number of faults that are control flow-insensitive is zero.
While more data is needed to make a definitive conclusion, the data suggests that BEN is likely to be more effective in localizing control flow-insensitive faults than control flowsensitive faults. This is expected since the fault changes the execution trace of the core member, which could be made very different from the execution traces of the derived members. Recall that a statement that is executed only by the core member but not by the derived members is considered to be highly suspicious and is thus ranked high. The more differences in the execution traces of the core and derived members, the more statements are ranked high. As a result, more statements may need to be inspected before the faulty statement is found. 
F. Threats to Validity
The major threat to validity is due to the fact that the subject programs and faults used in our experiments may not be representative of real-life programs. In particular, the subject programs in the Siemens suite are relatively small. To mitigate this threat, we have used two larger programs, i.e., grep and gzip. Moreover, we do not have complete control over the faults. To investigate the impact of one of the three fault properties, we fixed the other two properties. However, other factors, e.g., the nature of a fault, properties other than the three properties, could have affected the fault localization results. Finally, the number of subject programs and faults is very limited. More experimental data is needed to obtain higher confidence about the results.
V. RELATED WORK
Many empirical evaluations have studied the effect of different factors on the effectiveness of fault localization techniques. Abreu et al. [2] discussed the effect of adding more failed and passed runs. They conclude that the effect of adding more passed runs is unpredictable, whereas adding more failed test runs improves fault localization effectiveness. Their result also suggests that fewer instances of coincidental correctness improve the overall effectiveness of a fault localization approach. Coincidental correctness is a phenomenon in which a test case executes a fault, but coincidentally it does not result in a failure.
Jones et al. [17] evaluated the effectiveness of different fault localization techniques including Tarantula [18] , Set intersection [4] , Set Union [20] , nearest neighbor [21] and Cause transition [7] . In their experiment, effectiveness is measured based on the percentage of statements in the subject program that needs not be examined to find a faulty statement. Their result suggests that set-intersection performs the worst while Tarantula performs the best in locating faults. Their work is primarily focused on evaluating the effectiveness of different fault localization techniques, whereas our work is focused on evaluating the effectiveness of a particular fault localization technique in locating different fault types.
Baudry et al. [6] discussed the type of information needed for effective fault localization. Their work proposed a test-fordiagnosis criterion, which evaluates the capacity of the test cases to help fault localization. Their work discussed an explicit connection between testing and diagnosis. They introduce an attribute called Dynamic Basic Block (DBB) . All the program statements in the same DBB will have the same rank. They propose that DBB is a decisive factor in the diagnosis accuracy of a fault localization technique. Their results suggest that increasing the number of DBBs improves the overall effectiveness of fault localization. They also confirm a strong correlation between the size of a DBB and the diagnosis accuracy. Faults that are located in small DBBs are effectively localized. Their work is different from ours, because we focus on how the fault properties impact the effectiveness of a fault localization technique, whereas their work is focused on improving the capacity of test cases in order to improve the effectiveness of fault localization.
Yu et al. [25] studied the impact of various test suite reduction strategies on the effectiveness of fault localization. They used a vector based reduction strategy and a statementbased reduction strategy for their study. In the vector based reduction strategy, the reduced test suite covers the same set of statement vectors as the original test suite. A statement vector is defined as the set of statements executed by one test case. The statement-based reduction strategy uses a reduced test suite that covers the same statements as the original test suite. Their experiment investigates the effect of test reduction strategies on the following fault localization techniques, including Tarantula [18] , Statistical Bug Isolation [19] , Jacaard [2] and Ochiai [1] . They have used the Siemens suite [15] as their subject programs. Their results show that the vector-based reduction has a negligible effect on effectiveness, while statement based reduction significantly reduces the effectiveness. This work is focused on studying the effect of test case reduction in fault localization effectiveness, whereas our work is focused on understanding the effect of fault properties in fault localization effectiveness.
Renieris et al. [21] discussed the effect of two types of spectra, namely binary coverage spectrum and permutation spectrum, on the effectiveness of the nearest neighbor method. A binary coverage spectrum contains the coverage of basic blocks whereas a permutation spectrum records the number of times each basic block is executed. They compared the performance of nearest neighbor models to that of set union and set intersection methods. They use the Georgia Tech version [22] of the Siemens suite [15] as the subject programs for their experiments. Their work suggests that the nearest neighbor method has a better overall performance when compared to set union and set intersection method. Among the two nearest neighbor methods, the one using permutation spectrums is more effective than the other one that uses binary coverage spectrums. Their work is primarily focused on comparing the fault localization effectiveness of the nearest neighbor method with the set union and set intersection method and evaluating the impact of different types of spectra. Our work is different from theirs, as we are focused on evaluating the impact of fault properties on the effectiveness of BEN.
To the best of our knowledge, the only existing work focused on the impact of different fault types is by Bandyopadhyay et al. [5] . They studied how the effectiveness of Tarantula [18] in localizing faults is affected by three fault properties, including accessibility, original state failure condition, and impact. They have used the Siemens suite for their experimental study. Their results indicate that Tarantula effectively localizes faults that are hard to access and have low impact.
Our work is different from Bandyopadhyay et al. [5] in the following ways. First, our work evaluates the effectiveness of BEN, whereas their work evaluates the effectiveness of Tarantula. Second, while they evaluate the impact of accessibility, their approach to measure accessibility is different from ours as discussed in Section III.A. Third, in addition to the Siemens suite, our experiments include two real-life programs grep and gzip, which are significantly larger than the Siemens suite Finally, apart from the impact of accessibility, our work evaluates the impact of two other fault properties, i.e., input value sensitivity and control flow sensitivity, which are not evaluated in [5] .
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The focus of this paper was on evaluating the effectiveness of BEN for localizing different types of fault. In particular, we studied how three fault properties, namely accessibility, input value sensitivity, and control flow sensitivity, impact the effectiveness of BEN in localizing faults. Instead of using the exhaustive test set, which is nearly always impossible in practice, a random test set-based approach was adopted as an approximation to determine the three fault properties. The experimental results show that BEN is very effective in localizing faults that are harder to access in the subject programs. Furthermore, BEN is more effective for localizing input value-insensitive (or control flow-insensitive) faults than input value-sensitive (or control flow-sensitive) faults in the subject programs.
In the future, we plan to include more subject programs and faults in our experiments. In particular, our experiments currently do not have faults that are of high accessibility, input value insensitive and control flow insensitive. As a result, we were unable to evaluate the impact of such faults. We plan to create faults of different types either by using a mutation tool or by modifying the subject program manually but in a systematic manner. This evaluation will help to develop a better understanding about the effectiveness of BEN. The insights obtained from this evaluation can be applied to spectrum-based fault localization tools in general and can be used to identify opportunities for further research on combinatorial testing-based fault localization.
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